The Battle of Loos - how Haig tried to kill my grandfather

This very faded picture is the only image
I have of my maternal grandfather

A hundred years ago this month, on September 26, 1915, my maternal grandfather Richard Gibson Little took part in his first action of The Great War.

He was fighting with the 10th York & Lancaster Regiment, a regiment raised in the coalfields of England and soon to be machine-gunned to pieces in the coalfields of north-eastern France.

There are few 'safe' battles in the First World War, but aside from Paschendale and (for the French) Verdun, there were none with a higher chance of being killed in miserable circumstances than the Battle of Loos. The first day of the Somme saw more men killed, but it was a much bigger battle, and the percentage casualty rate for Loos was higher.

Thank goodness my grandfather somehow, by good fortune and quirk of fate, managed to be among the survivors.

His regiment was part of Lord Kitchener’s New Army. This was the first tranche of volunteers, the war having already killed a large number of the regulars and reserves. They had signed up in a wave of patriotism in 1914 and now they were being thrown into battle. I don’t know exactly why my grandfather enlisted. He was from Cumbria, a small village east of Penrith and in the 1911 census he was 22 and boarding at a farm in Burghwallis, just north of Doncaster. I guess work was easier to find in Yorkshire and, four years later, the army in France might have seemed a better option than being a farm hand.

Recruiting poster

For Richard Little and his contemporaries, war was an unknown experience. As working-class men, they would be used to a bit of hunger, a lot of hard work and general hardship, so perhaps (at first) the army seemed quite a nice number.

The training of this first wave of volunteers was not what we'd expect today, although in many ways little has changed (the army never seems to have enough, or the right, equipment). They volunteered in late summer and autumn, the first to answer Lord Kitchener's call to arms, but had no uniforms or guns. This extract is from the book Loos - Hill 70 by Andrew Rawson and describes the training of New Army recruits:

"Without weapons or uniforms, training options were limited, but days were filled with drills, parades or marches. Country lanes saw columns of marching men, dressed in a hotchpotch of clothes and boots.

"At most a battalion had only one or two officers with previous experience. Bankers, clerks and students became officers; teachers and policemen were promoted to sergeant or corporal. In many cases a man received his stripes because of his well-dressed appearance.

"The first batch of uniforms arrived in spring; not khaki as expected, but a selection of civilian outfits, including red and blue Post Office uniforms."

My grandfather's division was sent to Tring in Hertfordshire initially and then to camps at Halton Park in the Lune valley, near Lancaster. As winter came, they were accommodated anywhere they could be found a roof - churches, halls and cinemas were used. Their rifles weren't issued until summer - less than six months before going into action - when they practised shooting for the first time on Salisbury Plain.

They had no idea what they were in for - and it was probably just as well.

I must apologise for the next few paragraphs, which are full of the "10th this" and "63rd that", just stick with me and bleep over the detail if it gets too much.

The 10th York & Lancaster (my grandfather's battalion) was in the 63rd Brigade under Brigadier-General N T Nickalls, who was killed at Loos. The 63rd Brigade was part of the 21st Division (commanded by Major-General G T Forestier-Walker) and the 21st Division was part of XI Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General R C B Haking.

If Loos wasn't a battle you'd choose to fight in, Haking, nicknamed "The Butcher", was equally not a character you'd choose to serve under. He was Haig's man and a commander with a reputation for aggression. That didn't mean he sat on his horse at the head of his men and shouted "charge"; rather it meant that from the safety of his chateau, he was quite untroubled ordering men to attack. Like many First World War generals, he seemed to prize aggression and bravery over planning, preparation and training. He also seemed unperturbed by high casualties. At Aubers Ridge, a battle in May 1915, troops under Haking's command had suffered 60 per cent casualties in little over an hour, largely due to bad tactics, but also Haking's willingness to throw more and more men into an attack that was clearly failing. Perhaps he hoped the Germans might run out of machine-gun bullets?

At Loos, he had a lot more men to send to their deaths. The 10th Battalion York & Lancaster Regiment would have comprised around 1,000 men made up from four rifle companies of about 200 men each, plus support troops including machine-gunners, transport and supply. The 63rd Brigade, where the 10th Y&L was placed, also included the 8th Lincolnshire, 12th West Yorkshire and 8th Somerset Light Infantry - a total of about 4,000 men. The 63rd Brigade was in the 21st Division and that also included 62nd and 64th Brigade (so a total of 12,000 men). It also included four brigades of field artillery (12 field-gun batteries and four howitzer batteries), three companies of Royal Engineers and a company of pioneers (looking after supplies, labour and construction). There would have been upwards of 15,000 men - the equivalent to the population of a medium-sized town - in the 21st Division. Haking's XI Corps had three Divisions, so at least 45,000 men.

XI Corps was part of the British First Army with three Corps in its strength. Commander of the First Army was General Sir Douglas Haig and he was subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, Field Marshall Sir John French.

French seemed to be in poor health and, prior to the Battle of Loos, spent a lot of time in bed incommunicado. Perhaps he really did have a propensity for colds and flu, perhaps he had a drink problem? Either way, he didn't exactly have his finger on the pulse and he proved unable or unwilling to stand up to French pressure to act in their interests (not necessarily the BEF's).

Haig was an ambitious man with his eye on French's position (so not the best working relationship). He was also a cavalry man, whose tactics might be summarised as "break through the lines and turn the cavalry loose", he was hopelessly optimistic, set unrealistic goals and (in his private life) he was a committed spiritualist who believed God spoke directly to him. Even in an age when people were far more religious than today, it was unusual to be having a two-way conversation with God. If that wasn't enough, Haking was Haig's appointment and was clearly desperate not to let down his patron. If that meant pushing men into hopeless actions, so be it; if it meant doctoring reports and accounts of the battle to make things look good for Haig and bad for French, so be it.

The British army (with a few notable exceptions - Marlborough and Wellington spring to mind) has a long history of incompetent command even to the present day, but this particular set really were a shower. It would be comical if it wasn't such a tragedy.

Like so many other battles already fought and battles still to come, Loos was a disaster waiting to happen. It had many hallmarks of a First World War debacle:

•       A battle plan that was wildly optimistic.

•       Inept planning and generalship.

•       Appalling command and communication, especially on the second day.

•       Poor terrain - no way would Wellington have let his men fight here.

•       Not enough artillery.

•       Completely incompetent logistics.

•       Shells that didn’t explode.

•       Hand grenades that didn’t work.

•       And, of course, it started raining as soon as the attack started.

It was also the first battle where the Allies used poison gas and so determined were the generals to use it, that they ordered it to be deployed even though, in some places, the wind was blowing in the wrong direction, so it gassed many British troops who were waiting in trenches ready to attack.

My opinion of First World War generals is pretty low. On the British side, almost to a man, I rate them as criminally incompetent. The “lions led by donkeys” view has been somewhat revised by historians in recent years, pointing out that the First World War was unlike any other previous war and there was a steep learning curve to develop new tactics to overcome barbed wire, machine guns and elaborate defensive earthworks.

I can agree with the basic premise, it was a new type of warfare and, of course it demanded new tactics; what I can’t accept is that it took so long to work out what those tactics should be, or that the best way to learn was through reckless plans costings thousands of lives. For example, a creeping barrage was used successfully in 1915 but not regularly used until the last year of the war; we knew very quickly that shrapnel shells don’t cut wire but we used millions at the Somme and they still didn’t cut the wire ...

But it was far more than learning tactics, so much of the poor generalship was down to basic incompetence - not enough essential equipment, things in the wrong place, poor communication and blind optimism. The Army was steeped in class, privilege and snobbery, certainly not the meritocracy it needed to be. I find it incredible that Haig should have been given the top job after Loos and that he hung onto that job throughout the war. Despite Loos, despite the Somme, despite Paschendale, he remained in place - they even put up a statue in The Mall. What were they thinking - why is it still there?

But back to Loos and the events of a hundred years ago ...

Why did we fight the battle? It was the usual story, we had to support the French, who were launching major offensives in Champagne and Artois and wanted the British to tie up the Germans to prevent reinforcements being moved.

Even French and Haig had the good sense to know that this was a bad place to fight a battle and to choose to do so on a fairly wide front with insufficient troops and not enough artillery was a crazy idea. The BEF had suffered terrible losses and the original army and reserves had been decimated in several 1915 battles. The army was still awaiting the New Army recruits.

This part of France is not unlike East Yorkshire - wide, mainly flat, farmland with extensive coal-mining activity so the land is dotted with slag-heaps and the winding gear of pit-heads. Before war was declared, coal-mining would have been in full stream, and the slag-heaps were fresh, not greened over. Many had been fortified by the Germans and became strong redoubts with a commanding view of the countryside; in other places, small mining villages had been fortified. It was flat, open and the German lines (protected by barbed wire) extended into several depths, so that the loss of the forward trench would not mean a breakthrough.

The Germans had used poison gas (against the agreed conventions of warfare) at Ypres earlier in the year and the British had decided they now had the moral right to do the same. At this stage of the war, poison gas was a relatively unsophisticated weapon. Chlorine gas was used, released from heavy gas cylinders and directed into no-man's land by pipes. Chlorine irritates the lungs causing a discharge of fluid, resulting in choking and the victim could literally drown as his lungs filled up. Both British and German troops had been issued with gas masks, which were not completely effective and also cumbersome to use. The British gas masks were a canvas hood with round glass peepholes and a breathing hose leading to a filter with neutralising chemicals. It would have been unpleasant to sit in a chair wearing one; running across a battlefield, or any kind of physical exertion, would have been extremely demanding.

Vickers machine gun crew with gas masks by John Warwick Brooke - This is photograph Q 3995 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums (collection no. 1900-13). Licensed under Public Domain via Commons

The use of gas by the Germans at Ypres, against an unprepared defensive force without gas masks, should have resulted in a German breakthrough but didn't. A few Canadian troops stuck doggedly to their positions and repulsed half-hearted attackers who expected no resistance. Haig and his staff, over-optimistic to a man, expected that the British Army would find success where the Germans had failed. The main reason we were using gas was because we didn't have enough artillery or shells, but  we also didn't have enough gas, so it was decided that we'd use smoke candles instead and intersperse gas and smoke to confuse the Germans. No-one has ever died of confusion.

For the historian, Loos is an interesting battle. The Germans had fortified their lines and they were formidable enough, but the countryside was still relatively untouched by the war in the sense that it wasn't yet the hellish moonscape of craters and trenches, devoid of vegetation, that would soon stretch from the sea to the Swiss border. British troops fought at Loos in flat caps, with rifle and bayonet, and (except in a few areas) close trench fighting with men bombing their way along to take a trench, was not the norm. There were large-scale manoeuvres across open countryside, fighting in woodland, in towns (especially Loos itself) and on slag heaps, where the Germans were often dug in.

I won't go into a detailed account of the whole battle, but (in short summary), the attack began on September 25 and the first day saw some success. In parts, there was no forward progress possible, in other areas substantial gains were made, the village of Loos was taken and a breakthrough seemed possible.

The progress stalled because the attacking troops (even where they had broken through and achieved their objectives) had suffered massive losses - 8,500 dead on the first day, plus many more wounded. Until the Somme, nine months later, these were the worst losses in British military history. Officer casualties were a particular problem, leaving men without command. In the confusion of battle, many troops had ended up not quite where they were meant to and often mixed with other battalions.

Nevertheless, despite the dreadful losses, it would have been possible to spin the first day as a huge success (which the generals did). The challenge was to capitalise on that success and break through second-line defences. Sadly, day two of the battle was a bloody debacle and a good deal of the blame for the failure fell on XI Corps, the New Army men.

Nothing went well.

The first problem is that the reserves had been held well back from the front line and so had to make a difficult march on the last day, which took far longer than expected due to congestion and poor logistics behind the lines. You'll see from the 10th Battalion's war diary (below) that the troops had already marched some distance around northern France in the previous weeks, always at night in order to conceal movements from the enemy. The last march into the battle zone, with full kit, was undertaken in pouring rain, so they arrived tired, wet and hungry (the cooking stoves had been lost miles back). It was also dark. Some books (Nick Lloyd) say they were not issued with maps, but the war diary clearly refers to a map, so the 10th Battalion at least had one. What isn't in doubt is that battlefield intelligence and communications was appalling.

Orders either didn't arrive or arrived late. There are battalions who were given only 10 minutes to plan and begin an attack; other troops had an order to remain in trenches, delivered just as they'd obeyed the previous order to attack.

The section of the battlefield where my grandfather was engaged. Chalk Pit Wood, Bois Hugo and Chalet Wood are marked with the Lens-Hulluch road running alongside them. Hill 70 is to the south. The Loos-Hulluch road runs from the north of Loos to join the Lens-Hulluch road.

I know that at 3pm on the first day of the battle, my grandfather was at Vermelles. From there, they were ordered forwards and arrived at the battlefield at 10pm (according to the battalion diary). In his book Loos - Hill 70 Andrew Rawson says:

"For three hours they marched along the Lens highway in the pouring rain. Near Fosse 7 [a mine head] Brigadier-General Norman Nickalls moved to the front of the column, leading the 8th Lincolns and the 8th Somerset Light Infantry across country by compass bearing.

"Meanwhile, the 12th West Yorkshires and the 10th York & Lancaster [my grandfather's battalion] continued along the road as far as the Lens Road redoubt."

They were now in captured territory. The Lens Road Redoubt had been taken earlier in the day.

This description is by a Lieutenant in the 8th Lincolns, but Richard Little must have seen the same view: "as we got to the crest line [this would have been the Grenay Ridge] we could see the countryside slightly and what a sight met our eyes! Right ahead of us was Loos in flames, this was the glare that had puzzled us; the twin towers of the mine standing out like great oil towers on a burning oil field."

Those towers were twin winding gear of the mine in Loos. They were nicknamed Tower Bridge and stood throughout the battle.

The village of Loos before the war with the twin winding gear of
Tower Bridge - a landmark during the battle.

General Nickalls of the 63rd (my grandfather's brigade) and General Mitford of 72 Brigade met each other on the eastern slope of Grenay Ridge at 1am and, in accordance with their instructions they decided to press on to the German second line. Unknown to them, Haig had revised the plan - because of heavy casualties on the first day, he had decided during the afternoon to attack with the New Army troops and an order had gone out to halt on the Grenay Ridge. At 1am, this hadn't reached Mitford or Nickalls and so they decided to press on.

Mitford finally received the order before he moved out, but Nickalls (and my grandfather) had already left. That may have saved his life; if he'd stayed, his battalion may have been among those attacking the German Second line across land which was later called the "Field of Corpses." The brigade moved east, skirting the burning ruins of Loos. As they crossed the valley, they came under heavy machine gun fire and, for a time, it appeared as though it came from Chalk Pit Wood to their left. In fact the wood was held by British troops supporting 2 Brigade in Bois Hugo. The fire was actually coming from Hill 70.

It was only good luck that avoided a blue-on-blue attack on Chalk Pit Wood as the war diary of 63 Brigade reports:

"No information had been received that the position of the Chalk Pit was in occupation of our troops. Luckily no unfortunate results took place, which might very easily have occurred with new troops advancing to a position at night which was not known to be in our possession. It reflects great credit on the officers concerned, who kept their men so well in hand ... The absence of information of what was happening elsewhere was nothing short of disastrous, as no-one knew what anyone else was doing."

Brigadier-General Nickalls of the 63rd found Brigadier-General Pollard of 2 Brigade in the Chalk Pit and they decided that 63 Brigade would relieve 2 Brigade.

Andrew Rawson writes: "Throughout the remaining hours of darkness, the New Army men took over the shallow trenches in and around Bois Hugo. Although they were tired, having spent the last eight hours on the March [more like 12], there was no time to rest. With dawn approaching, the men tried to dig into the hard chalk with their entrenching tools. Brig-General Nickalls knew that his brigade now held the front line. Not sure of where troops were on his flanks, he planned to wait until further orders arrived.

"The Brigade was deployed as follows: A, B and C companies of the Lincolnshire held an east to west line east of the Lens-Hulluch road and along the southern edge of Bois Hugo and facing Hill 70. Three companies of the West Yorks were on the left of the Lincolnshire facing east; the fourth company of the Lincolnshire with the remaining company of West Yorks were in reserve in the angle formed by the front line. The Somersets (less two companies) were between the western side of the Lens-Hulluch Road and the Chalk Pit Wood, while the York & Lancaster carried the Brigade along the road north of the Chalk Pit, but the left flank was entirely in the air."

The position was not strong. Bois Hugo wood extended west to east towards the German second line and a strongpoint called Stutzpunkt V. They didn't control the whole wood and their position was an awkward bulge on the front line. As they dug in, the Germans were planning their counter-attack.

Andrew Rawson summed up the position as day two of the battle dawned: "Changing circumstances, poor planning and a complete lack of staff work had scattered First Army's reserve across the battlefield. In many cases corps and divisional headquarters did not know where their troops were."

Haig's plan was to continue the attack with the New Army divisions on the German Second Line between Hulluch and Bois Hugo, which is directly in front of where my grandfather was lying in his shallow trench by the side of the Lens-Hulluch road.

There was a major snag - the Germans held Hill 70 and would be able to pour down a murderous fire into the flanks of troops attacking to the north. So the battle plan for day two was that the British would capture Hill 70 and then the mass attack on the German second line would take place between Hulluch and Bois Hugo. If the line could be broken and Hulluch taken, a major breakthrough was on the cards.

It didn't happen. There hadn't been enough artillery to support the original offensive (which is why poison gas was used) and now the artillery was in the wrong position and not sure where to fire. If Hill 70 was to be taken, it would require robust artillery support, but it didn't happen. The artillery shelled our own troops who had been hanging on grimly through the night and then attacking troops fired on them in the belief they were Germans. If that wasn't enough, German artillery was now shelling British positions on Hill 70 and Loos itself.

This is an example of where blind optimism took over at high command. Haig had allowed a half-hour barrage to drive the Germans off Hill 70. As the war diary of the 13th Royal Scots (charged with attacking Hill 70) concluded: "It was not likely that guns, which had not been registered, would accomplish in half an hour what four days bombardment and 40 minutes of gas was considered necessary to achieve on the 25th."

By 10.30am, an hour-and-a-half after the British attack began, the Germans were in control of the hill and British troops were hanging on grimly, dug-in below the top.

My grandfather and 63 Brigade were in a perilous position. They were pushed well forward and not well dug-in. Their orders were at 11am to advance through Bois Hugo and Chalet Wood as part of a general attack on the German Second Line. If successful, they would have emerged from the wood right in front of the Studzpunkt V strongpoint and, without artillery support shelling the German line, they would have been annihilated.

What happened was a different kind of annihilation - the Germans began shelling Bois Hugo and then followed with a massed infantry attack on Chalet Wood, 200 metres to the south, where they succeeded in driving out the 6th Cameron Highlanders, who had held the wood overnight, but were exhausted and running low on ammunition. They were wiped out almost to a man.

With the Germans now controlling Chalet Wood (which had commanding views of the Loos valley), 63 Brigade's position was worsening. They were under attack and both flanks were exposed. Brigadier-General Nickalls sent a request for reinforcements from 64th Brigade to his rear but his battalion commanders were still instructed to advance eastwards (as ordered) at 11am.

It was an optimistic command, but no-one had a chance to carry it out. At 10.30am, they were attacked on the east side of the wood, but the Germans were driven off easily. Undeterred, they attacked again in greater numbers. The Germans were reserve troops rushed forward overnight from Douai. They attacked both the east and south sides of the wood simultaneously. Three companies of the 8th Lincolnshires held the southern boundary and three companies of the 12th West Yorkshire the east. The trenches of the West Yorks were overwhelmed and the survivors fell back in a confused mass. To the south, the Lincs men were also falling back. Seeing the retreat, the two companies of the 10th York & Lancaster also pulled back. I don't know if my grandfather was in this group or whether he was in one of two companies who were now in Chalk Pit Wood west of the Lens-Hulluch road.

During the attack Brigadier-General Nickalls was killed. A number of attempts were made to rally the men, but they came to nothing.

The 63rd Brigade war diary does not give a glowing account of the action: "During the retirement, regimental officers and NCOs did not give much assistance in trying to rally the men (there were a few exceptions in the case of officers but the NCOs were useless). No attempt was made to carry out the retirement as a military operation, NCOs and men simply retired in any direction and anyhow they liked."

Here, I'm reminded of the account of how men were selected at recruitment. "At most a battalion had only one or two officers with previous experience. Bankers, clerks and students became officers; teachers and policemen were promoted to sergeant or corporal. In many cases a man received his stripes because of his well-dressed appearance."

Just because a man has a smart suit, it doesn't mean he'll make a good NCO. Our selection of leaders, like so much else, had been amateurish and now we were paying a heavy price.

I find it hard to be too critical, however. An ordered withdrawal has to be one of the most difficult military manoeuvres, even for experienced troops. Also, the fighting was severe and the casualty figures reflect this. Seventy-one officers were killed or wounded in the Brigade and, in the 8th Lincolnshire, every officer was a casualty. In less than an hour, 63 Brigade had lost more than 1,300 men and was no longer an effective fighting unit. There would be no advance through Bois Hugo or Chalet Wood.

Brigadier-General Nickalls was now dead, but his request for reinforcements (sent at 8.53am) had been received (at 9.44am) and the 14th Battalion Durham Light Infantry were sent forward with orders to join Nickalls at Bois Hugo and "there act as he might require."

It's hard to be clear about what happened next. Andrew Rawson in Loos - Hill 70 says that as the DLI approached 63 Brigade, they were fired on by their own troops who rose from their trenches and charged them in the belief they had been outflanked and they were German troops (the DLI were wearing long greatcoats). Instead of consolidating the position behind Bois Hugo, there was then a general retirement of both 63 Brigade and the DLI. Nick Lloyd in Loos 1915 says that the men of the DLI, being young miners, would not enter trenches which contained dead men due to superstition. As most trenches would contain dead men, this seems unlikely and is probably an example of First Army prejudice against the New Army soldiers.

It's possible that the DLI reinforcements arrived as 63 Brigade were pulling back from Bois Hugo. This withdrawal was not well ordered (as we've learned) and most of their officers had been killed or wounded. Seeing unfamiliar, fresh troops behind them, they initially fired on them, but then (having realised their mistake and pressed by German infantry) they continued their withdrawal.

The Germans held both Bois Hugo and Chalet Wood and had time to consolidate their positions.

It was now 11am, the time planned for the general attack on the German second line between Hulluch and Bois Hugo. The planning for this attack had assumed that both Hill 70 and Bois Hugo were in British hands. By now, the Durham Light Infantry and remnants of 63 Brigade had rallied at the foot of the slope north of Loos, possibly ahead of the Loos-Hulluch road. Two battalions of DLI, part of 64 Brigade, were ordered to move east towards Bois Hugo, but instead moved south-east and began advancing in short rushes up the slopes of Hill 70.

Again, the remaining British troops on Hill 70 were mistaken for Germans. German machine-gun fire directed at the British on Hill 70 was overshooting and landing among the DLI battalions, so it appeared the fire was coming from British positions. The DLI were attacking their own troops, but as they moved up the hill, their flank was exposed to German fire from Chalet Wood and Bois Hugo.

In a final bid to secure the line along the Lens-Hulluch road, 64 Brigade sent two battalions of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry forward along with as many rallied men as possible (certainly 63 Brigade men). They were ordered not to go beyond the Lens-Hulluch road.

An observer in the German 106th Regiment occupying Bois Hugo saw "masses of infantry advance in about twenty waves on a front between Chalk Pit Wood and Loos. The advancing masses were taken under fire by the machine guns and rifles of the Hill 70 redoubt and enfiladed by those of the 153rd Regiment and 106th Regiment. The effect of this fire from two sides was very considerable, whole lines being mown down by the machine guns."

Andrew Rawson says that by 11am [I'm suspicious of that time] 64 Brigade had lost 1,000 men and (like 63 Brigade) was finished as an effective formation. He says that only two companies were holding the line north of Loos, but the war diary of the 10th York & Lancaster Battalion describes the attempt to rally and establish a line on the Lens-Hulluch road and four further attempts to move forward during the afternoon east of the Loos-Hulluch Road, which I assume is the line north of Loos which Rawson describes. It's clear that the 63 Brigade men driven back from Bois Hugo and the Lens-Hulluch road, mixed up with other troops, are continuing to fight during the afternoon.

Meanwhile, to the north, the final part of Haig's second day plan is being acted out. This is an infantry attack eastwards, north of Bois Hugo and up to Hulluch. Knowing that Bois Hugo and Hill 70 were in German hands and would fire on their flanks, plus fire from strongpoints Stutzpunkt III and IV and Hulluch, this was clearly a suicidal attack, especially with little or no bombardment of the German second line.

Essentially 4,000 men marched in formation to their deaths. They continued to press forwards, despite the fire, and then discovered German wire, uncut, in the long grass in front of the second-line defences. No-one got through the wire. By 12.30pm, the attack had ground to a halt with 2,500 casualties and the survivors pinned down in pockets in the long grass or in a sunken road south of Hulluch. The area between Bois Hugo and Hulluch was called the "Leichenfeld von Loos" by the Germans and simply "Field of Corpses" by the British.

Determined pockets of resistance prevented a German counter attack, but the Germans were probably quite happy with their day's work.

On the third day, two Guards brigades were tasked with retaking Chalk Pit Wood, Puits 14 (along the Lens-Hulluch road) and Hill 70. Chalk Pit Wood was taken, but men were driven back from Puits 14 and Hill 70 remained in German control. Among those killed was the son of Rudyard Kipling.

We ended the battle with minor gains at a massive loss of life (60,000 casualties).

The inquest began very quickly and much of the blame for the failure on day two was levelled at the New Army reserve troops (including my grandfather's battalion). Haig wrote in his diary that they wouldn't fight because they hadn't been fed - a rather trite remark, because they certainly fought (and died).

I feel compelled to defend my grandfather, but there were certainly issues with the performance of the New Army soldiers. This was their first action and how could anyone expect them to display the same effectiveness as seasoned troops. The performance of their NCOs, in particular, may have been lacking, but perhaps not unexpected as the men were chosen randomly and had no previous combat experience.

The poor handover of command from French to Haig was much criticised along with the claim that French had positioned them too far back to be in a position to relieve troops smoothly at the end of day one. This, ultimately, cost French his command, but I suspect much of this post-battle spin was engineered by the ambitious Haig to secure the top job.

My grandfather's medals. The one in the centre is the
1914-15 Star, awarded to soldiers who were under fire
in France up to the end of 1915.

Did they perform that badly? I don't think they did. The battle was horrendous and the war diary of the 10th York & Lancaster Battalion clearly tells that they were in action throughout day two and suffered almost 50 per cent casualties.

On day three, experienced, elite Guards battalions also failed to secure and hold territory that 63 Brigade had been tasked to do.

Why were the New Army troops used on day two? In 1925, Col G Stewart, GSO of 21st Division wrote: "It was thought the reserve divisions would go into action for the first time full of esprit and elan, being ignorant of the effects of fire and the intensity of it, they would go forward and do great things."

That might well have been the case had there been a better plan. Haig expected the men to break the German second line without artillery support and with no real idea what he was up against in terms of defences or opposing troops. The failure to take Hill 70 meant the Germans could see everything and fire on any troop movements. The debacle of the "Field of Corpses" is an example of men going forward and doing great things against unbeatable odds.

Loos was lost on the first day, when the poor battle plan meant gains were made only at considerable expense and the soldiers who fought were so depleted, they were unable to make further progress or hold ground they had taken. After day one, the reserves were badly deployed, staff had no idea where anyone was and there were many examples of bad communications and command. The biggest failure was British artillery, which was in short supply, failed to move up effectively and was unable to support British attacks or bombard German troops moving to counter attack.

For the record, the French failed to break through the German first line at Artois and, although they broke through the first line at Champagne, they could not penetrate the second-line defences.

The Duchess of Argyll

WAR DIARY

This is a transcript of the War Diary of the 10/York & Lancaster Regiment with some notes in square brackets added by me:

10 Sep 1915 - Folkestone

10.30pm - sailed from Folkestone on the Duchess of Argyll [this was a paddle steamer and you can read more about it here: http://freespace.virgin.net/tom.lee/argyllimg.htm] for Boulogne.

11 Sep 1915 - Boulogne

1.30am - arrived and proceeded to rest camp Ostronove, arrived 2.30am.

11 Sep 1915 - Pont a Briques [railway station in Boulogne, on the Rue de Dr Brousse]

5.15pm - entrained for Watten

11 Sep 1915 - Watten

11.07pm - arrived, proceeded at once by march on route to Nortebecourt [Mentque-Nortbécourt]

12 Sep 1915 - Nortebecourt

2am - arrived, close billeted (Brigade manning confirmed).

20 Sep 1915 - Nortebecourt

6pm - march route via St Omer.

21 Sep 1915 - Campagne

1am - arrived, close billets.

7.30pm - march route via Aire.

22 Sep 1915 - St Hilaire

12.45am - arrived, close billets.

7pm - march route to Auchel.

22 Sep 1915 - Auchel

10pm - arrived, close billets.

24 Sep 1915 - Auchel

7pm - march route for Sailly La Bourse, bivouacked for night.

25 Sep 1915 - Sailly La Bourse [Sailly Labourse]

3pm - march route to Vermelles

25 Sep 1915 - Vermelles

10pm - arrived and went straight into action towards Hulluch-Lens road and Hill 70 (appendix I attached). Relieved by the Scots Guards 3.30am 27 Sep 1915.

27 Sep 1915 - Noyelles Les Vermelles

7am - returned from action having lost approx 360 all ranks [later corrected (3 Oct 1915) to 14 officers, 306 other ranks killed, wounded, missing; 1 riding horse, 1 HD horse, 4 draught mules, 5 pack mules]. Names and ranks, officers and men - appendix II.

28 Sep 1915 - Noyelles Les Vermelles

7pm - moved by road and rail to Rely via Noeux. Passed very heavily.

29 Sep 1915 - Rely

10am - arrived, close billets.

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Appendix I

Report of Operations 25th-26th Sept 1915 by 10th York & Lancaster Regiment.

On arrival at N Corner of Loos G29 D65 received order to proceed as fast as possible to pn 69 E of Loos-Haisnes Rd and that the Regiment would form reserve with the 12th East York Regt to an attack on Hulluch-Lens Road.

This was carried out until the leading Battalion (Lincoln and 8th Somerset LI [Light Infantry]) had crossed the Hulluch-Lens Road when orders to move more to the N and take up an entrenched position on the Hulluch-Lens Road facing E. The line when taken up extended from Red House by Chalk Pit E of Square Wood at ps H25 AG6 to junction of roads at H19 CS9 [I think the square wood would refer to Chalk Pit Wood and the line extended along the Lens-Hulluch road as far as its junction with the Loos-Hulluch road].

On arrival, I reported the fact to the Brigadier. Although entrenched one had to keep down as sniping was persistent from direction Hill 70 or Square Wood [the term "square wood" is used throughout the diary and I think it refers to several different woods. In this instance, it may refer to either Bois Hugo or Chalk Pit Wood, where men thought firing was coming from].

About 8.30am a verbal order came for two companies to attack Square Wood [this has to be Bois Hugo]. B and C Coys were detailed for the purpose and I took these two Coys personally. The remaining two Coys fell back on road Hulluch-Lens and as we were hard pressed in the Square Wood A Coy was sent up to reinforce. No further orders were received from the Brigade. As the other side of the wood was reached a very heavy machine gun fire from concealed positions drove us back. While the attack was being made D Coy again took up the original position on the Hulluch-Lens road with the right resting on Red House by Chalk Pit and eventually linked up with 8 Somerset LI. [This account suggests Bois Hugo was held by Germans and had to be cleared. Loos - Hill 70 suggests the men took over the positions and didn't have to clear the wood].

The three Coys driven out of the Square Wood on M25a fell back on sothern [sic] road Loos-Hulluch. Rallied at this place together with a number of the Scotch Brigade. During the attack through the wood C Coy lost all officers. The commander Captain DWSE Abbott, I regret to say, was shot and died shortly after while being carried back.

After the sunken road was held for some time it was seen that the position was untenable as guns placed in the vicinity NE of Benifontaine raked this road and reports received were that the Germans were there in force. A Lt Colonel in the Scotch Brigade  considered that this line should move back into the Southernmost German trenches. On this retirement as no reports were received we had no means of communicating with troops on the left. The Colonel made the above decision under very heavy machine gun fire. This movement was taking place when Captain Foster, Div Staff, suggested a rally on a line parallel to a track running NE. I took charge of this which consisted of cover from this line. Other lines were formed in the rear. After the first line had passed through this line advanced and eventually became part of the firing line with objective Square Wood in H258. This attack met with strong opposition from machine gun fire from concealed guns. Another rally was made in the sunken road, Southern road, Loos-Hulluch and this was eventually evacuated as in the preceding case. By this time the Regiment had lost a good number of officers and men. This was repeated four times during the course of the afternoon but was impossible for the troops to get beyond a line drawn NS from second O on LOOS. After these four gallant attempts were made but the machine gun fire was too powerful and the men were in a very exhausted condition. All the ranks worked very hard to attain the objective but could not locate the exact position of the concealed machine guns. After that fourth attempt it was seen that a general retirement as far back as the German trenches was taking place. I collected men of the 63rd Brigade at pt G25 and soon put them in the trenches NE of the road. After a short period Colonel Denny of the 8th Somerset LI arrived and I handed over command. I regret to report that in addition to the death of Captain Abbott 13 other officers are wounded or missing and about 400 men are unaccounted for yet. [I believe this describes a battle to hold ground to the east of the Loos-Hulluch road and retake Chalk Pit Wood, which was retaken by 2 Guards on 27 Sep]

G Jarvis Major

Commanding 10th York & Lancaster Regiment

Ref maps 5a (Hazebrouck), 36b, 36c

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Appendix II

10th Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment

Roll of casualties (officers)

Action 25th and 26th September 1915

Killed: Captain Abbott DWSE, Captain Loftus HG, Lieut Smith PL.

Wounded: Captain Mitford AH, Captain Holmes WG, Captain Willis AJ, 2nd Lieut Mein WH, 2nd Lieut Morton Smith F, 2nd Lieut Robinson AR, 2nd Lieut Swallow HLSG.

Wounded and missing: Lieut Whitaker GG, Lieut Groves SJS, Lieut Whitham GS.

Gassed but recovering: 2nd Lieut Drake DH.

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After the action, a number of men were recommended for honours (I don't know if the recommendations were accepted). They were:

Lieut Francis Barrington Baker: When detachment on right of regiment had been driven in, this officer very ably and with great coolness seconded the efforts of the Brigade Major and formed a firing line on the Hulluch/Lens Road.

Major Cecil Hugh Taylor: in rallying his company and holding on to the Chalk Pit for a considerable time.

Pte Cuthbert Waterhouse Binns and Pte John Farimond: when Lieut PL Smith was wounded and on stretcher, bearers refused to carry stretch owing to heavy shell fire. Private Binns and another Private (since killed) volunteered to carry Lieut Smith in. On the Private (above) being killed, Private Farimond volunteered to take his place and with Private Binns brought Lieut Smith in across an area swept by rifle, machine gun and shell fire.

Captain Frank Taylor: showed great coolness and devotion to duty throughout the day and by his coolness and indifference to danger set a fine example to the men. After B Coy had lost all its officers, he collected the men and deployed them under heavy fire on the Lens/Hulluch Road.

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In the days following the Battle of Loos, the men of the 10th York & Lancaster Regiment were moved to Rely where they stayed until 1 Oct. They then marched to Thiennes and Borre, arriving on 2 Oct and remaining there for two weeks. While they were there some efforts were made to make good the losses suffered at Loos. Records show 48 men from the 11th Battalion York & Lancaster Regiment were added, plus 100 men from the 3rd Battalion and eight officers from the 11th Battalion.

On 15 Oct, they marched to Strazeele where they remained until 24 Oct. Further replacements arrived during this time, including one officer and 181 other ranks from base. Fourteen men arrived back from the casualty clearing station. During this period, second in command, Major Raven was sent to England to report to the War Office.

On 24 Oct, the men were marched to Steenwerck via Bailleul and then on to Armentieres, about 10 miles south of Ypres where they were engaged in the trenches from 27 Oct.

BOOKS READ

Loos - Hill 70 by Andrew Rawson

Loos 1915 by Nick Lloyd

Catastrophe - Europe Goes to War 1914 by Max Hastings

Loos 1915 by Peter Doyle

Loos - Hohenzollern by Andrew Rawson

Goodbye to All That by Robert Graves

A Higher Form of Killing by Diana Preston

Memoirs of an Infantry Officer by Siegfried Sassoon

Images of England - The York and Lancaster Regiment compiled by Jane Davies

Battlefield Guide to Western Front - North by Major and Mrs Holt

QUOTES

"Our new armies entered into action for the first time and fought with conspicuous valour, and tens of thousands of them fell in the futile carnage of the Loos offensive."

- Lloyd George, War Memoirs

"What happened," I asked.
"Bloody balls-up," was the most detailed answer I could get.

- Robert Graves, Goodbye to All That